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In 1965, the United States rapidly increased its military forces in South Vietnam, prompted by the realization that the South Vietnamese government was losing the Vietnam War as the communist-dominated Viet Cong gained influence over much of the population in rural areas of the country. North Vietnam also rapidly increased its infiltration of men and supplies to combat South Vietnam and the U.S. The objective of the U.S. and South Vietnam was to prevent a communist take-over. North Vietnam and the insurgent Viet Cong sought to unite the two sections of the country. Political instability and internal dissent continued to plague the government of South Vietnam although in June General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Air Marshall Nguyễn Cao Kỳ took control of the country and remained in power for the remainder of the year. In the United States, a majority of Congress and the people supported U.S. participation in the war although protests against the war became larger and more frequent, especially among college students. The U.S. began bombing North Vietnam in March in Operation Rolling Thunder. The U.S. Army and Marines began ground operations to ferret out and defeat the communist forces. General William Westmoreland commanded U.S. forces in South Vietnam. Westmoreland's strategy was attrition, employing U.S. superiority in firepower, technology, and mobility. The usual military tactic of the United States was search and destroy operations in which large U.S. and South Vietnamese units, supported by air and artillery, swept through an area to attempt to engage the communists in battle. North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, by contrast, relied on hit-and-run operations and ambushes, avoiding set-piece battles except at their own initiative. In November the U.S. and North Vietnamese armies met head-on for the first time in the Battle of Ia Drang. Both sides claimed victory. The U.S. inflicted heavy casualties on the North Vietnamese, but the battle vindicated the conviction by North Vietnam that its military could slowly grind down the U.S.'s commitment to the war. South Korea contributed an army division to South Vietnam and Australia, New Zealand and other countries provided smaller numbers of soldiers. North Vietnam received military aid from the Soviet Union and China. At year's end, President Lyndon Johnson declared a temporary halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and undertook a diplomatic initiative to seek negotiations with North Vietnam. North Vietnam, on its part, aimed to achieve a decisive military victory, but prepared also for an expanded war if the U.S. continued to escalate its involvement. Most of the reports and conversations mentioned below were secret and not made public for many years. They reflect the ongoing debate among American officials, military leaders, and the American people about the scope and character of American intervention in the Vietnam War. ==January== ; 1 January The South Vietnamese security forces, including regulars, part-time militia, Montagnard irregulars, and National Police totaled 567,246 personnel.〔Clarke, p. 20〕 23,310 U.S. military personnel were in South Vietnam.〔"Timeline, 1963-1964, http://www.vietnamgear.com/war1963.aspx, accessed 8 Sep 2014〕 The number of Viet Cong guerrillas and North Vietnamese regulars in South Vietnam was a matter of much debate. One U.S. government estimate was that the Viet Cong army consisted of 40,000 full-time fighters and 80,000 to 100,000 part-time guerrillas.〔Clarke, p. 19〕 The Department of Defense's fact book estimated that the Viet Cong numbered less than 200,000 plus 39,175 political cadre.〔Adams, p. 34〕 These numbers presumably included thousands of fighters and cadre infiltrated from North Vietnam during the previous five years. The first North Vietnamese army units dispatched to South Vietnam, consisting of three regiments (about 5,000 men), had arrived in South Vietnam in late 1964.〔Asselin, Pierre (2013), ''Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965'', Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 200〕 A junior-level CIA analyst, Samuel A. Adams, had just begun work estimating Viet Cong numbers and he would later conclude that the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) underestimated Viet Cong strength by about one-half.〔Clarke, p. 20; Adams, p. 84〕 Both North Vietnam and the United States would rapidly increase the number of their troops in South Vietnam during 1965. ; 2 January The Battle of Binh Gia concluded. The Viet Cong withdrew from the battlefield. In six days of fighting the Viet Cong had killed 201 of South Vietnam's best soldiers and five American advisers.〔Logevall, pp. 302-303〕 ; 3 January Senator Mike Mansfield, considered the U.S. Congress's most knowledgeable person about Vietnam, appeared on television and said that neutralization of South Vietnam through an agreement reached by negotiations between the U.S. and the communist powers might be the best solution to the Vietnam War. Mansfield was one of several senators who had doubts about the course of U.S. policy in South Vietnam.〔Logevall, pp. 305-306〕 ; 6 January The U.S. Ambassador in South Vietnam General Maxwell Taylor summed up the situation in a telegram to the U.S. government in Washington. "We are faced here with a seriously deteriorating situation characterized by continued political turmoil, irresponsibility and division within the armed forces, lethargy in the pacification program, some anti-US feeling which could grow, signs of mounting terrorism by VC directly at US personnel and deepening discouragement and loss of morale throughout SVN. Unless these conditions are somehow changed and trends reversed, we are likely soon to face a number of unpleasant developments ranging from anti-American demonstrations, further civil disorders, and even political assassinations to the ultimate installation of a hostile govt which will ask us to leave while it seeks accommodation with the National Liberation Front and Hanoi." Taylor opposed the introduction of U.S. ground units to help fight the Viet Cong (as proposed in frustration by President Johnson a few days earlier), endorsing instead a U.S. policy of graduated air attacks against the Ho Chi Minh trail, the supply line for the Viet Cong, and North Vietnam itself.〔FRUS, Document 9〕 ; 20 January While Buddhist protests against the government and the United States intensified, including the burning of a United States Information Service library, Ambassador Taylor met with a Buddhist leader. He said the Buddhists wanted peace and told Taylor that the leaders of South Vietnam were only interested in the benefits they could derive personally from American aid and would otherwise capitulate to the Viet Cong. The Buddhists had been protesting against the government of South Vietnam for the previous two years.〔Logevall, p. 212〕 ; 26 January Former Vice President Richard Nixon in a speech argued that the U.S. military effort should be escalated to destroy communist supply lines and staging areas in Laos and North Vietnam. He said that the U.S. must "either get out, surrender on the installment plan through neutralization, or...find a way to win.〔Johns, Andrew L. (June 1999), "A Voice from the Wilderness: Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, 1964-1966", ''Presidential Study Quarterly'', Vol. 29, No. 2, p, 321. Downloaded from JSTOR.〕 ; 27 January Amidst continuing political chaos in South Vietnam, General Nguyễn Khánh and the Armed Forces Council overthrew the civilian government of Trần Văn Hương in a bloodless coup and replaced Houng with a civilian, Nguyễn Xuân Oánh. Khánh, who had been Prime Minister during most of 1964, had been hovering in the background for some time so the coup d'état was not a great surprise. Ambassador Taylor cabled Washington that Khánh had an alliance with the Buddhist Institute headed by Thích Trí Quang. He said, "The most sinister aspect of this affair is the obvious danger that the Buddhist victory may be an important step toward the formation of a government which will eventually lead the country into negotiations with Hanoi and the National Liberation Front."〔Logevall, p. 316〕 ; 27 January In response to the coup in South Vietnam, National Security Council director McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of State Robert McNamara wrote a memo to President Johnson. They gave the President two options: use American military power to defeat the insurgency or negotiate thus attempting to "salvage what little can be preserved." McBundy and McNamara favored the first option; Secretary of State Dean Rusk disagreed. Johnson accepted the military option and sent a telegram to Ambassador Taylor in Saigon saying "the U.S. will spare no effort and no sacrifice in doing its full part to turn back the Communists in Vietnam." President Johnson had crossed the Rubicon.〔Logevall, pp. 317-319〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「1965 in the Vietnam War」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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